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A B S T R A C T
In 2012, China's first diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment system was piloted in Beijing. This study explored
whether this payment pilot improved quality and reduced costs of acute myocardial infarction (AMI) care in
hospitals implementing DRG payment as compared to control hospitals. A difference-in-difference study design
was used with regression and considered several quality indicators including aspirin at arrival, aspirin at dis-
charge, β-blocker at arrival, β-blocker at discharge, statin at discharge, in-hospital mortality, and 30-day
readmission rates. DRG payment mechanisms without specific mechanisms to promote care quality did not
improve quality of AMI care. Future studies should study the impact of cost control mechanisms together with
quality improvement efforts to assess how quality of care may be improved within the Chinese healthcare
system. These lessons would be helpful to share with lower-middle-income countries undergoing rapid devel-
opment that are transitioning to a significantly higher burden of non-communicable diseases.
1. Background
According to the 2010 WHO report, improving the performance of
health systems is a cornerstone of health reform, which includes im-
proving both the efficiency and quality of healthcare (WHO, 2010).
Quality of care (QoC) is directly related to health outcomes, and thus
should receive significant attention.
Health systems in many industrialized countries have undergone
reforms from retrospective payment to prospective payment systems
(CPC Central Committee and the State Council, 2009; State Council of
the People’s Republic of China, 2015). Diagnosis related groups (DRGs)
(Busse et al., 2013) have been introduced in many of these countries as
a payment system that encourages health care providers to assume fi-
nancial risks, which can motivate providers towards greater efficiency
through controlling costs (Kahn et al., 1992), while improving quality
of care (Davis and Rhodes, 1988). In recent years, there has been in-
creasing interest in lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) to in-
troduce DRGs in order to control costs (Mathauer et al., 2013). Pol-
icymakers, however, have paid more attention on the potential for DRG
payment for cost control, but have paid much less attention on the
potential to improve quality of care. In the early stages of DRG in-
troduction in the United States through Medicare payment, Rock ex-
pressed concerns that the economic pressure of DRG payment might
adversely affect quality of care (Rock, 1985). The focus of DRG impact
on care quality has been primarily in higher income countries (Kahn
et al., 1990). Research in LMICs with health systems in transition due to
the rapid pace of economic development is severely lacking.
The Chinese government plans to roll out DRG payment nationwide
to replace traditional fee-for-services payment, which has significantly
driven up the costs of care in China (General Office of the State Council,
2017). The DRG pilot in China has previously shown its potential to
reduce health expenditures and out-of-pocket costs (Jian et al., 2015).
There have been no studies in China on the impact of DRG payment on
care quality. Before broarder implementation of policies promoting
DRG payment, it is important to study the challenges to implementation
as well as potential impact on quality of care. China is committed to-
wards the introduction of DRG payment. Research, however, is needed
to inform China's health system overhaul, which is an important part of
China's continued development and economic transition.
This study assessed the impact of DRG payment reform pilots in
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Beijing on quality of acute myocardial infarction (AMI) care. China's
Ministry of Health in 2011 released the “Tertiary Hospital Accreditation
Criteria,” which proposed for the first time, measurement of process
indicators in China. These included AMI, congestive heart failure,
stroke, and pneumonia. Amongst these, only AMI was covered through
Beijing's DRG payment pilot in 2012. AMI was therefore chosen for this
study to assess for quality improvement in the setting of DRG payment
reform. Given an essential lack of a quality improvement system in
China, this work features some of the first opportunities available in
China to develop and implement a system to improve quality of care.
Efforts to measure and improve care quality in China have been few and
limited, and adequate process measures are greatly needed in China.
We hope that this study will share lessons on how to develop these
systems in countries with healthcare systems undergoing major social
and economic transitions to promote opportunities for reform and im-
provement of healthcare systems.
2. Methods
2.1. Study design
Six DRG pilot hospitals and 8 control hospitals were matched ac-
cording to annual inpatient and outpatient load, number of beds, and
clinical and administrative personal. Pilot hospitals implemented DRG
payment for 108 specific conditions and procedures beginning in
October 2011. These DRGs had been selected by the Beijing Health
Insurance Bureau to pilot given higher within-group homogeneity as
confirmed by the coefficient of variation (< 0.85). ‘Potential DRG
cases’ refers to cases at pilot hospitals eligible for DRG-payment as well
as corresponding cases at control hospitals, though control cases were
paid through fee-for-service (FFS) mechanisms. DRG cases post-reform
actually paid through DRG payment were considered ‘DRG payment
cases.’ Post implementation of reform, about 1/3 of potential DRG
payment cases at pilot hospitals were in actuality paid through a FFS
mechanism due to difficulties in billing implementation despite DRG
eligibility, which was a major flaw in reform design. These cases are
designated ‘FFS reversion.’ It has shown in previous studies that older,
higher number of more comorbidities, and more severe cases have a
greater probability of being paid through FFS. Further details on DRG
payment design and FFS reversion have been described previously (Jian
et al., 2015).
We compared the characteristic difference between FFS reverted
cases and DRG payment cases. Due to data limitations, we can only
examine the differences in age, gender, and treatment of AMI cases (see
Appendix Table 1). There were no significant differences in age dis-
tribution between the two groups; more women were reverted to FFS as
were more coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) cases. Reasons for
this may include the lack of ability to recognize AMI in women, who
may present atypically. Additionally, CABG cases may be more ex-
pensive, which may have stimulated the FFS reversion. Although there
was no direct evidence, the fact that the proportion of CABG was re-
latively high suggested that severe AMI cases may be reverted to FFS.
It is worth noting that the process quality measures we use are
suitable for all AMI cases (whether mild or severe). In other words, the
severity of the condition does not affect these measures. Therefore, even
if some severe cases are reverted to FFS, the conclusion will not be
affected.
2.2. Setting and participants
The Beijing Health Insurance Bureau administers health insurance
through the Beijing Employee Basic Health Insurance Scheme
(BEBHIS), which covers 12 million people or 60% of the city's popu-
lation. Discharge data for BEBHIS patients were obtained from 14 ter-
tiary general hospitals over the period of January 2010 to September
2012.
2.3. Variables
Several process and outcome quality indicators were used based
upon National Quality Forum endorsed indictors, which are evidence-
based and have been validated (Cardiovascular Disease Branch of
Chinese Medical Association, 2001, 2015; National Quality Forum,
2015; O’Gara et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2011). The majority of indicators
are based off of indicators from the United States Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services or from the American College of Cardiology
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid, 2016). They are: 1) aspirin at arrival
(percentage of AMI patients who received aspirin within 24 h before or
after hospital arrival); 2) β blocker at arrival (percentage of AMI pa-
tients who received β-blocker within 24 h before or after hospital ar-
rival); 3) Aspirin prescribed at discharge (percentage of AMI patients
who are prescribed aspirin at hospital discharge); 4) β-blocker pre-
scribed at discharge (percentage of AMI patients who are prescribed a
β-blocker at hospital discharge); 5) statin medication at discharge; 6)
in-hospital mortality, and 7) readmission rate within 30 days.
Better quality was represented by lower in-hospital mortality rate
and lower readmission rates. It was also represented by higher per-
centages of aspirin at arrival, β-blocker at arrival, aspirin prescribed at
discharge, β-blocker prescribed at discharge, and statin at discharge.
2.4. Statistical methods
The pre- and post-reform periods were compared applying a dif-
ference-in-difference (DID) methodology to assess if DRG payment sti-
mulated improvement in quality of PCI and CABG procedures for AMI.
Baseline differences as well as trend differences over time between pilot
and control hospitals were controlled for through the DID method to
increase the validity of estimated impacts.
Two outcome indicators (in-hospital mortality and 30-day all-cause
readmission rate) and five process indicators (aspirin at arrival, β
blocker at arrival, aspirin prescribed at discharge; β-blocker prescribed
at discharge, and statin medication at discharge) were included. Linear
probability regression analyses were conducted based on the following
formula:
= + + + +Y α β T β RH δT RH ωX2 2 3 2* ,it (1)
where T2 = 1 if year = 2012, T2 = 0 if year = 2010 or year = 2011;
RH = 1 if 6 pilot hospitals; T2 * RH is the DID variable and its coef-
ficient δ represents the effect of DRG payment. X comprises a set of
control variables including gender, age and the square of age. In order
to test if pre-reform trends between pilot and control hospitals were
similar as part of assessing for DID parallel trends, we used two points
of data from before the intervention (2010 and 2011). We can augment
equation (1) in the following manner:
= + + + + ∗ + ∗ +Y α β T β T β RH δ T RH δ T RH ωX1 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 ,it
(2)
where, T1= 1 if year= 2011; T2= 1 if year= 2012. If δ1=0, the
parallel-trend assumption holds and δ2 can be interpreted as the DRG
effect. If δ1=0 does not hold, then the true effect of the DRG inter-
vention is the net of δ2 and δ1.
All analyses were conducted using Stata 12.0 (College Station,
Texas).
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive data
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for DRG cases. AMI diagnoses
were based upon discharge diagnosis and included both ST elevation
acute myocardial infarction (STEMI) and non-ST elevation acute myo-
cardial infarction (NSTEMI). Post-reform in 2012, there were a total of
1,374 acute myocardial infarction (AMI) cases at pilot hospitals eligible
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for DRG payment. These 4 DRGs included: complicated PCI with stent
(N= 1221, 88.9%), uncomplicated PCI with stent (N= 69, 5.0%),
CABG (N=84, 6.1%), and CABG without cardiac catheterization
(N=27, 2.0%). In the period before implementation, all cases in the
pilot and control hospitals received FFS payments. In the period after
implementation, 71.1% of the cases that were eligible to receive DRG
payments did receive them, while 28.9% were FFS reversion cases (data
not shown).
In 2012, the proportion of aspirin prescribed at arrival, β-blocker
prescribe at arrival, aspirin prescribed at discharge, β-blocker pre-
scribed at discharge, and statin prescribed on discharge in the AMI
cases of pilot hospitals were 96.7%, 71.0%, 93.1%, 78.0% and 70.0%
respectively. The first four indicators improved after the DRG payment
reform in both the pilot hospital and the control hospitals, while the last
indicator has worsened in both the pilot hospital and the control hos-
pital. The in-hospital mortality fell from 2.0% before the reform to 1.6%
after the reform in pilot hospitals, while it fell from 1.6% to 1.0% in
control hospitals. The 30-day readmission rate fell from 2.9% before the
reform to 2.6% after the reform in pilot hospitals, while it rose from
3.6% to 4.4% in control hospitals.
3.2. Main results
Fig. 1 shows the impact of this DRG payment reform on the in-
hospital mortality and 30-day readmission rates for DRG eligible AMI
cases. From the results of DID regression analysis, the impact of reform
is not obvious for the DRG eligible cases, DRG payment cases and FFS
reversion cases (data not shown).
DRG payment, however, has an impact on the quality of process
indicators of AMI cases. Fig. 2 shows the analysis of DRG eligible cases.
For the cases of PCI with stents that had complications, which were
eligible to be paid for through DRG, 67.6% received β-blocker within
24 h of admission. This was an increase from 62.5% before the DRG
payment (from 2010 to 2011). This improvement, however, has stag-
nated, and β-blocker prescriptions post-reform in 2012 have fallen back
to pre-reform levels in 2010. For the PCI cases with stent placement that
were uncomplicated, the proportion of patients who received aspirin
within 24 h of admission fell from 91.5% to 87.5% after the DRG re-
form. For CABG cases, those who received β-blocker within 24 h of
admission had an upward trend before the reform from 69.6% in 2010
to 76.9% in 2011, but were lower after the reform with 66.8% in 2012.
For cases paid through DRG payment, several indicators had similar
trends (Fig. 3). For PCI cases with stent placement that had complica-
tions, β-blocker on arrival, β-blocker at discharge, and statin medica-
tion at discharge had shown trends in increase pre-reform (from 62.5%
to 67.7%, 79.0%–84.4%, and 71.8%–77.0% respectively). These in-
dicators, particular that of β-blocker prescription on arrival, however,
fell after the reform. For PCI cases with stent placement that were un-
complicated, rates of aspirin on arrival decreased significantly after the
reform from 93.3% to 86.9%. Discharge on a statin medication had
been increasing before the reform from 75.9% to 80.5%, but fell back
after the reform to 73.4% in 2012. For CABG, the levels of β-blocker on
arrival showed increases before the reform but fell after the reform.
Fig. 4 shows the changes in the quality of FFS-reversion process
indicators before and after the reform, which show a very different
trend from DRG payment cases. In contrast to DRG payment, there were
no trends toward improvement pre-reform with decline post-reform. In
FFS reversion cases, trends of improvement (including discharged on a
statin for uncomplicated PCI and CABG cases) pre-reform continued
post-reform, and there were a few indicators that were improved post-
reform including β-blocker at arrival for CABG cases, and β-blocker for
both complicated and uncomplicated PCI cases.
4. Discussion
This is the first study on the impact of DRG payment on quality of
care in China. We examined AMI cases due to the standardization of
diagnosis and treatment processes (Gao et al., 2008) and availability of
clear process and quality indicators of hospitalized AMI patients (Jian
et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015; Pena et al., 2010; Zheng
et al., 2016). We found that for cases of PCI with stent placement that
had complications, the rates of β-blocker prescriptions on arrival and β-
blocker prescriptions at discharge trended towards improvement before
the reform. After the implementation of DRG payment, however, this
improvement stagnated, with lower rates of prescriptions for aspirin on
arrival for PCI cases with stent placement that were uncomplicated. For
cases DRG eligible but ultimately paid through FFS reversion, none of
the quality indicators were found to be significantly lower than the
baseline period or improved after the reform in both PCI and CABG
cases. Although DRG payment did not affect outcomes of in-hospital
deaths and 30-day readmissions, the results suggest that increasing
hospital awareness of cost control through DRG payment alone without
specific efforts to promote quality may be a barrier to quality im-
provement.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the sample characteristics, costs, outcomes, medication prescription, and procedure type pre- and post-reform in pilot and control hospitals,
2010–2012, Beijing, China.
2010 and 2011 |2/t-test (p-value) 2012 |2/t-test (p-value)
Pilot hospitals Control hospitals Pilot hospitals Control hospitals
Total Potential DRG or DRG Cases 2,196 2,198 1,374 1,351
Gender (N, %) Male 1,714 (78.1%) 1,805 (82.12%) 11.405 (0.001) 1,082 (78.8%) 1,129 (83.8%) 10.339 (0.001)
Female 482 (22.0%) 393 (17.9%) 292 (21.3%) 222 (16.4%)
Age (N, %) 19–40 64 (2.9%) 78 (3.6%) 6.437 (0.092) 46 (3.4%) 53 (3.9%) 5.562 (0.135)
41–60 1,024 (46.6%) 1,082 (49.2%) 634 (46.1%) 672 (49.7%)
61–80 1,036 (47.2%) 974 (44.3%) 629 (45.8%) 559 (41.4%)
> 80 72 (3.3%) 64 (2.9%) 65 (4.7%) 67 (5.0%)
Procedure type and complications
CABG (N, %) 143 (6.5%) 215 (9.8%) 70.387 (< 0.001) 84 (6.1%) 112 (8.3%) 23.889 (< 0.001)
Uncomplicated PCI with stent (N, %) 135 (6.2%) 73 (3.3%) 69 (5.0%) 26 (1.9%)
Complicated PCI with stent (N, %) 1,918 (87.3%) 1,910 (86.9%) 1,221 (88.7%) 1,213 (89.8%)
Indicators
Aspirin at arrival 2077 (94.6%) 1972 (89.7%) 35.908 (< 0.001) 1328 (96.7%) 1281 (94.8%) 5.6185 (0.018)
Aspirin prescribed at discharge 2031 (92.5%) 2037 (93.1%) 0.682 (0.409) 1279 (93.1%) 1295 (95.9%) 9.9789 (0.002)
Β-blocker at arrival 1474 (67.1%) 1361 (61.9%) 12.986 (< 0.001) 976 (71.0%) 995 (73.7%) 2.328 (0.127)
Β-blocker prescribed at discharge 1688 (76.9%) 1740 (79.2%) 3.376 (0.066) 1071 (78.0%) 1111 (82.2%) 7.849 (0.005)
Discharged on Statin Medication 1866 (85.0%) 1805 (82.0%) 6.502 (0.011) 962 (70.0%) 877 (64.9%) 8.074 (0.004)
In-hospital mortality (N, %) 43 (2.0%) 35 (1.6%) 0.843 (0.359) 13 (1.6%) 21 (1.0%) 3.447 (< 0.001)
Readmission rate within 30 days (N, %) 63 (2.9%) 78 (3.6%) 1.635 (0.201) 36 (2.6%) 60 (4.4%) 6.647 (0.010)
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Payment systems may affect treatment behaviors of providers,
which may affect quality in the setting of payment reform. In shifting
from FFS to DRG payment, financial risks borne by providers increase
significantly, which gives providers more incentive to actively control
costs. DRG payment systems promote efficiency without sacrificing
quality by motivating providers to reduce unnecessary services.
Quality, however, is impaired if necessary services are reduced (Cots,
n.d.; Lave J, 1989; Busse et al., 2013), as we found in this study. This
effect, however, is not easy to observe (Busse et al., 2013; Kim et al.,
2016). Quality outcomes such as mortality and readmission rates that
are used to measure DRG payment impact are helpful indicators but are
not sensitive as process indicators to effectively assess the impact effect
on quality (Forgione et al., 2005). In prior studies, only a few outcome
indicators found improvements in quality (Forgione et al., 2004). For
example, a review of studies in OECD countries (Forgione et al., 2004)
found that DRG payment was associated with slower quality gains with
respect to patient mortality from surgical and medical adverse events.
Another study in Japan (Hamada et al., 2012) found that DRG pay-
ments increased the rate of readmissions. Most studies on outcome in-
dicators have not found significant impact on quality by DRG payment
(Forgione et al., 2004; Brügger, 2010). Process indicators have been
underutilized in studies of quality improvement in DRG payment
systems. Pairing outcome and process indicators to assess for quality
improvement as in this study may be helpful for deepening the un-
derstanding of how this payment system may improve quality of care
(Ranasinghe et al., 2014; Wang, 2014; Wang et al., 2014).
Our findings in this study using process indicators suggests that DRG
payment may affect processes for diagnosis and treatment. Five process
indicators for quality assessment were used in this study. These in-
cluded aspirin prescribed on arrival, β-blocker prescribed on arrival,
aspirin prescribed at discharge, β-blocker prescribed at discharge, and
statin prescribed at discharge, which are all considered necessary ser-
vices for the treatment of AMI. Our results found that after DRG pay-
ment implementation, hospitals had a tendency to reduce provision of
some of these critical medications, which ultimately reduced quality of
care.
Some research suggests that DRG payment may not always improve
quality, similar to the findings in our study though research using
quality indicators has been limited. A series of papers published in
JAMA (Kahn et al., 1990) showed that after the introduction of DRG
payment, the likelihood of patients discharged home in an unstable
condition was increased. In Swedish, a study (Ljunggren and Sjödén,
2010) showed that patient satisfaction decreased after the introduction
of DRG payment. A French study (Or, 2014) suggested that existing
Fig. 1. Effect of DRG payment on in-hospital mortality and 30-days readmission of DRG eligible AMI cases, including complicated PCI with stent, uncomplicated PCI
with stent, and CABG between pilot and control hospitals, 2010–2012. NOTES: We used regression to determine the percentages of change based on estimated
difference-in-differences between the pilot and control hospitals, controlling for patients' age and sex.*p < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Fig. 2. Effect of DRG payment on process quality of DRG eligible AMI cases, including complicated PCI with stent, uncomplicated PCI with stent, and CABG between
pilot and control hospitals, 2010–2012. NOTES: DRG-eligible cases are AMI cases eligible for DRG payment but may have been ultimately paid through either DRG or
FFS mechanisms. We used regression to determine the percentages of change based on estimated difference-in-differences between the pilot and control hospitals,
controlling for patients' age and sex. Only the indicator with statistically significant differences are marked in the figure.*p < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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challenges to ensure medically appropriate care were actually worsened
after the implementation of DRG payment. This prior research suggests
that there may be a role for using process indicators to assess impact on
quality. Similar to findings in this study, DRG payment may not ne-
cessarily improve care quality.
Motivation for cost reductions in the setting of DRG payment may
be driving these reductions in prescription of critical medications,
which can negatively impact quality of care. Quality improvement
systems are urgently needed to coincide with DRG payment im-
plementation in China to ensure that quality of care is not being sa-
crificed in order to have improved cost control.
4.1. Policy implications
With strong purchasing and negotiating power, large health insurers
can be a powerful driving force for improving quality of care. This in-
cludes maximizing potential for serving as a buyer of health services
while navigating shifting from fee-for-service to bundled payments. The
establishment of quality improvement systems with partnerships be-
tween providers, insurers, and government regulatory agencies is cri-
tical, to monitor and improve quality as well as mitigate any potential
negative impacts of emphasizing cost control over quality (Yip et al.,
2012; Yip and Hsiao, 2014). In OECD countries, the introduction of
DRGs had led to improvements in coding quality as well as the quality
of medical data. DRG medical data can allow measurement of quality
on a routine basis by using existing data within the health system. Such
quality monitoring systems has been increasingly used in Germany,
Switzerland and Austria (Busse et al., 2009). Use of routinely collected
data to monitor for gaps in quality is incredibly important as part of a
system to use this data to provide higher quality of care.
It is also necessary to consider introducing “pay by performance
evaluations". In the design of pay-for-performance, objective quality
indicators, including outcome indicators and process indicators, are
used as the core basis for measuring performance for provider. These
Fig. 3. Effect of DRG payment on process quality of DRG payment AMI cases, including complicated PCI with stent, uncomplicated PCI with stent, and CABG between
pilot and control hospitals, 2010–2012. NOTES: DRG payment cases were paid through DRG payment mechanisms. We used regression to determine the percentages
of change based on estimated difference-in-differences between the pilot and control hospitals, controlling for patients' age and sex. Only the indicator with
statistically significant differences are marked in the figure.*p < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Fig. 4. Effect of DRG payment on process quality of FFS-reversion AMI cases, including complicated PCI with stent, uncomplicated PCI with stent, and CABG between
pilot and control hospitals, 2010–2012. NOTES: FFS reversion are DRG-eligible cases that were ultimately paid through FFS mechanisms. We used regression to
determine the percentages of change based on estimated difference-in-differences between the pilot and control hospitals, controlling for patients' age and sex. Only
the indicator with statistically significant differences are marked in the figure.*p < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
W. Jian, et al. Social Science & Medicine 243 (2019) 112590
5
providers in turn receive higher compensation by providing higher-
quality care. Under such an incentive mechanism, the provider is in-
centivized to meet the quality standards in order to obtain full payment,
which motivates providers to proactively maintain and improve the
quality of care. Currently, higher income countries have greater levels
of experience (Busse, 2011) with pay for performance. For example,
within the Commission for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework
of the UK (Department of Health, 2012), DRG based payments can be
increased at the hospital level if hospital quality indicators are able to
demonstrate high quality. Payments to a hospital for all patients falling
into one DRG can be increased if the hospital scores above average on
DRG specific quality indicators. For example, in Germany a pay for
quality contract between a large insurer and a hospital in Karlsruhe
awarded higher payments for bypass surgery if in-hospital mortality
and post-surgical mediastinitis were below the German average.
There are several limitations to this study that should be considered.
First, although all the hospitals in the DRG pilot were included in this
study, this was not a random sample of all the hospitals in Beijing, since
randomization is not possible with natural experiment studies. We used
8 local comparable hospitals as control groups and controlled time
trends through the difference-in-difference model to limit the potential
bias. Second, data were limited by information based upon claims data
at discharge available through the Beijing Health Insurance Bureau.
Claim data is only accurate to “hours” for the execution time of the
treatment measures. Therefore, measurements cannot be made for in-
dicators requiring specific time measurements of shorter duration.
Third, because our data was based on billing, we were unable to capture
if this payment systems were turning away sicker patients. Only pa-
tients who had been admitted and paying through FFS or DRG payment
were included. Fourth, nearly 29% of AMI DRG cases post-reform were
reverted to FFS payment mechanism, which was a significant bias in a
reform design. Using our data, we can see cases of DRG payment and
FFS reversion have no difference in age and gender distribution.
However, due to data availability, we are unable to perform in-depth
analysis of other features of FFS reversion cases. Fifth, we did not ex-
plore the issue of upcoding because we cannot determine from the data
whether upcoding or miscoding had occurred. This issue of upcoding
should be explored in further studies. Sivth, only early results based on
the first year of post-reform discharge data were analyzed. After 2013,
“global budgets” were promoted in some hospitals in Beijing including
some hospitals in this study control group. Therefore, the data range
involved in this study is only available until 2012. We are unable to
observe the mid- and long-term effects of the reform as a result.
5. Conclusions
Introduction of DRG payment in countries with significant eco-
nomic, social, and health transitions such as China is hoped to curb
excessive growth of medical expenses under fee-for-service systems. As
demonstrated by this DRG pilot on AMI quality, sole emphasis on costs
may reduce the quality of medical care by shifting emphasis away from
providing optimal quality. As the purchaser of care and not just the
controller of medical expenses, health insurance in China and other
countries in transition needs to fully consider the price of care balanced
against the quality of care. Countries considering quality improvement
systems should be committed to supporting providers to actively in-
stitute mechanisms to promote quality of care such as through pay-for-
performance.
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